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Abstract:   
Ideally, the methods of statutory interpretation would be an intrinsic part of university 
legal education. In practice, however, although statute in everyday law has become 
ever more central, teaching of statutory interpretation has not developed alongside.    
Teaching staff in universities typically have to cover the topic in one or two lectures 
and the format does not encourage students to think the subject is important.  This 
article describes an experiment in teaching statutory interpretation differently.  It 
introduces Francis Bennion's NESSSI method and shows how students were 
encouraged to use this to see a complex and political House of Lords decision in an 
unexpected light.   
 
One of the signal difficulties in teaching statutory interpretation to new law students is 
convincing them that it has any real value for their studies or their career. If this 
sounds an extraordinary statement to make, consider what it is that most law students 
are taught about statutory interpretation. Almost certainly, they will be taught the 
three "rules" (literal, golden and mischief) and perhaps some mention of the 
teleological approach of the pan-European courts. A good course may briefly 
introduce Cross's unified contextual approach. Students may be asked to analyse a 
case or two, identifying which rule the judges (apparently guided by little other than 
judicial fashion or personal preference) could be said to have applied.  
 
It is unlikely that they will be taught much else, though they may be given some 
useful tips from the Interpretation Acts, such as to read singular as including plural 
and vice versa. They may however then be given a case in which this did not happen, 
leading the more savvy students to conclude that even a tip as simple as this will not 
really help them work out the meaning of an actual provision of a statute. A 
demanding course may cover the case law on s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
ask them to find a thread of consistency in it – but it is more likely that this, being a 
technique which academics have accepted is of some value to legal studies, will be 
placed elsewhere and within the topic of human rights rather than statutory 
interpretation. 
 
What does this tell the intelligent and inquiring student?  Such a student, with the wit 
to sift out what is useful from what is on the syllabus because the lecturing staff have 
been told it should be there, will conclude that statutory interpretation is a vague and 
simplistic rationalisation after the event. Nothing about the exercise will have 
demonstrated to the astute individual that statutory interpretation can be a practical 
and efficient set of techniques to learn. It will not have encouraged such a student to 
appreciate that while statutory interpretation techniques do not always provide an 
answer, they do expedite the task of looking for the answer. It is very unlikely to 
dawn on the audience that because most UK statutes are drafted by professional 
drafters who apply the many criteria of statutory interpretation when designing a 
statute, those criteria are a shorthand way of working out what Parliament intended. 
Furthermore, as Francis Bennion says- 
“The clue that should not be missed is that statutory interpretation keys into the 
whole system of law; indeed that whole system is subject to the relevant scheme 
of interpretation and in turn feeds into it. This means that statutory interpretation, 
when treated comprehensively as it is in the present work, forms perhaps the best 
modern introduction to a country’s entire legal system”1. 
 
The problem of course is what else the overworked academic with an overfilled 
syllabus can reasonably be expected to do. Francis Bennion's fourth edition of 
Statutory Interpretation comes in at around 1300 pages, and his Understanding 
Common Law Legislation is still a book-length treatment of a topic which tutors hope 
to cover in a lecture or two.  Bennion and I have elsewhere written about how this 
element of law-text analysis should be embedded in a curriculum rather than treated 
as a discrete and implicitly esoteric topic,2 but this requires a law school, not merely a 
single tutor, to adopt a specific approach throughout the delivery of the law degree. 
Nevertheless, without making any very dramatic changes it is possible to present a 
cursory treatment of the topic in a way which at least emphasises its potential value 
rather than communicates an unspoken (whether or not unintended) message that it is 
worthless. 
 
I describe here first Bennion's NESSSI method which shows how statutory 
interpretation can be applied in practice. I then discuss the structuring of a single class 
exercise at Glasgow University School of Law in which students were not taught 
statutory interpretation in depth. Rather they were introduced to a practical application 
of NESSSI, with the aim that they appreciate how useful it might be to them. The 
purpose of the class was simply to introduce the students to the omnipresent three 
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rules and the better scholarship in statutory interpretation, while also showing them 
that there are a set of criteria out there which could make their working lives easier in 
a world where parliaments produce new statutes every month.  
 
NESSSI stands for "New Scientific System of Statutory Interpretation" and was 
developed by Francis Bennion from the method and criteria set out in his Statutory 
Interpretation. Its initial purpose was to assist practitioners but it is also useful to 
students who wish to break down the task of statutory interpretation into a set of 
instructions and simpler steps. Bennion summarises the NESSSI approach in this way: 
 
"The first step is always to find out and set down the exact wording of a doubtful 
enactment, stripping it of unnecessary words. Then the opposing constructions of 
the enactment which need to be put forward by either side are worked out. The 
construction favoured by the client needs to be supported by all relevant 
interpretative criteria. These consist of (1) rules of interpretation; (2) principles 
derived from legal policy; (3) presumptions based on the nature of legislation; 
and (4) linguistic canons of construction.)"3 
 
A fuller exposition of the approach can be found by reading together Appendices A 
and B of Bennion's Statutory Interpretation (see either the current fourth edition or 
the forthcoming fifth edition, due late in 2007). The two appendices to the fourth 
edition are also available online.4 
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The class exercise taught at Glasgow University was introduced into a pre-existing 
course, Sources and Institutions of Scots Law. This course provides an introduction to 
legal system and public law. It has a distinctive pedagogy centred around student 
learning rather than lecture-based teaching. The course is delivered in a 
predominantly seminar format. Students prepare independently for a two-hour 
seminar each week (allocating around ten hours of study for each seminar). A typical 
seminar is led by a tutor but contains a range of exercises intended to draw the 
students into discussion which is supported, rather than dictated, by the tutor. The 
seminar is usually reinforced by a single introductory lecture given the week before.   
 
The NESSSI exercise was designed to occupy about half of the seminar time (around 
one hour). The rest of the seminar involved an analysis of two cases, one of which 
was a human rights case, applying some of the simpler or more familiar criteria of 
statutory interpretation. The students were given (a) a prior lecture on statutory 
interpretation (b) a few pages of materials written by several of the teaching staff 
which gave a summary introduction to statutory interpretation (c) Francis Bennion 
“The Real IRA is Proscribed After All” 168 JPN 6945 and Lord Bingham’s speech in 
R v. Z (Attorney General for Northern Ireland's Reference) [2005] 2 AC 645, [2005] 
UKHL 35. The students were also expected to have read (for the other exercise) short 
extracts from Bennion's Understanding Common Law Legislation. All these set 
materials were provided physically in a course pack with copyright permission 
obtained for the published materials.   
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Bennion's JP article is an example of NESSSI in practice, using clear headings to 
distinguish the process by which he comes to argue that a member of a proscribed 
organisation should not be punished for membership under s 3(1) the Terrorism Act 
2000, because a close reading of the legislation should lead the reader to conclude that 
the legislation in fact failed to proscribe it.  The article is an easy one for students to 
read, because Bennion sets out all his arguments in a list with headings. 
 
The case Bennion discusses is an intriguing one for many students. Those with an 
interest in activist politics may be aware that the Terrorism Act 2000 has been heavily 
criticised for creating what many see as very broad, and somewhat vague, definitions 
of terrorist activity. Some of the Glasgow students might have picked up that one of 
their Level 2 tutors, Adam Tomkins, had deplored this development on the ground 
that the 2000 Act has been used in practice to silence rather than prosecute, which 
encourages human rights abuses.6 This was also briefly mentioned to the students in 
the lecture on statutory interpretation which preceded the exercise.   
 
It is rather ironic, then, that the case came to the House of Lords in the context of a 
prosecution, and a prosecution in which it will seem blindingly obvious to the 
students that Parliament intended the accused to be convicted. They had further been 
told that Z was a member of the Real IRA, which had claimed responsibility for some 
monstrous acts of violence, including the bombing of Omagh in 1998 in which 29 
people were killed – possibly the worst atrocity carried out by a Northern Irish 
terrorist body.  Had the Lords found in favour of Z, it would have been widely said 
that he was released “on a technicality”. Why then, the students were asked, would an 
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experienced legislative drafter - with no Irish Republican sympathies - argue that Z 
should be found not guilty?   
 
Lord Bingham's speech is selected from the House of Lords decision which was 
reached after Bennion wrote his article, and which comes to a conclusion different 
from Bennion's. The students were given only Lord Bingham's speech due to limits on 
time; his speech was selected on the grounds that as senior Law Lord he was the most 
senior judge on the panel.7 This also helped to focus the students' minds on the 
disagreements between Bennion and Lord Bingham, rather than lose their attention in 
subtleties of differences of opinion among their Lordships.  
 
I have mentioned that one purpose of the exercise was to interest the students in the 
potential of a good method of statutory interpretation. It also had a second purpose.  
This was to present them with an intriguing conflict on which it was hoped they 
would not immediately take sides. One difficulty with teaching law to enthusiastic and 
opinionated – or cynical – students is that they often decide early on that judicial 
reasoning (both statutory interpretation and the use of precedent) is nothing more than 
political justification in disguise. They fail to see how statutory language or precedent 
can restrict decision-making. While this view does reflect one strand of jurisprudential 
thinking which they are of course entitled to adopt as their own, it would be better if 
students developed their jurisprudential perspectives on the basis of some experience 
rather than unreasoned prejudices acquired before they have any understanding of law 
in practice. In the NESSSI exercise, the Glasgow students were presented with an 
apparently bizarre interpretation of the law which seems to make sense only as a 
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genuine dispute about legal interpretation,8 not as an exercise in covert political bias. 
(Clearly it may indicate deeper political beliefs about the role of the judge which are 
less incongruous or shocking, but here we are concerned with the immediate 
contradictions suggested to the students by the readings.) 
 
In his speech in Z, Lord Bingham argues that statutory interpretation is not carried out 
in the abstract but rather directed towards particular circumstances. In this case the 
most important of these circumstances, he maintains, is the historical context in which 
the statutes proscribing Irish terrorist organisations can be shown to have a common 
aim of eliminating all such bodies. He concludes that Parliament plainly intended to 
proscribe the Real IRA and observes that identifying the precise relationship between 
the Real IRA and the IRA would be "an almost theological inquiry".9 He adds that 
any reasonable member of the Real IRA would believe that the organisation was 
proscribed, so the law is in practice clear. Lord Bingham's unspoken major premise10 
appears to be that it is more important to give effect to what Parliament thought it had 
done in enacting an anti-terrorist statute than to consider whether in fact two 
organisations with shared militant words in their title are sufficiently alike that they 
can be fairly described for penal purposes as operating under the same name.  
 
In his article, Bennion emphasises the rule that parliamentary intention is expressed 
by the words used. We may be able to divine what government intended when 
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promoting a bill, he notes, but we cannot know what Parliament intended when 
legislating. The literal meaning of the words used in s 3 excludes the Real IRA: it is 
not reasonably foreseeable to a person reading Schedule 2 that the words "Irish 
Republican Army" include the Real IRA. He also disputes the conclusion that all the 
previous statutes proscribed the Real IRA. Justice is served when penal law is clear 
and certain, Bennion observes, and certainty and clarity are more important than 
giving effect to a flawed law. Acquittal is therefore the just outcome. Bennion's 
unspoken major premise appears to be that a fair legal system applies the rules and 
principles by which it is bound and that upholding one of its fundamental principles - 
that there can be no punishment without clear law - is more important than the 
temporary embarrassment caused by an unpopular but right decision.  
 
The students were asked first what Bennion's arguments were (in the form of statutory 
interpretation criteria) for and against treating the Real IRA as a proscribed 
organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000. They were then asked to summarise Lord 
Bingham's statutory interpretation arguments and to give a reasoned explanation of 
which position they preferred.  They were to prepare this in advance and then discuss 
their answers in small groups of four or five in class, before presenting the 
conclusions of each group to the class as a whole.  A handout was then given to the 
class, summarising the key technical and ethical issues raised by the exercise. (The 
students were not told beforehand that they would be given this handout, as this might 
have encouraged them not to bother preparing the reading.) 
 
The tutors were instructed to emphasise at the start of the small group discussion how 
surprising it was that Bennion, better known for an independent right-wing orientation 
than any leftist allegiance to violent resistance movements, would want to argue that a 
terrorist should escape prosecution by means of what looks very much like a 
"technicality". The aim here was to make it clear to all the students that there was an 
interesting puzzle to resolve, rather than a straightforward choice which they could 
make quickly on the basis of their own political sympathies. 
 
The results were encouraging, both in the three groups which I tutored and reportedly 
in other groups which tutors discussed with me afterwards. No formal method of 
evaluation was used to study student learning, so only an impressionistic summary 
can be offered here. More formal evaluation will be applied when a similar exercise is 
undertaken next year at Stirling University's law school (where I now work).   
 
The response of the students was animated, compared to a standard exercise in 
applying the three rules (which Glasgow University does not now use in any of its 
teaching). Students expressed uncertainty over which side to take and interest in what 
the case meant for the rule of law, and asked questions about how statutory 
interpretation might work in other cases. Opinion was divided on whether to agree 
with Bennion or Lord Bingham, and crucially, listening to the small group 
discussions, it was clear to me that many students took one side or the other only after 
taking part in the debate.   
 
The handout they were then given provided them with a summary of what would have 
been discussed and also relieved the tutors of the task of having to lead the class 
through a demanding exposition of all the many questions raised by the exercise.  
About fifteen minutes were allotted in the seminar to allow them to read it.  This made 
it easier to ensure that all participating students had access to a clarificatory statement 
of the key topics, without needing to rely on busy tutors to master a sizeable package 
of mostly unfamiliar materials. It should be emphasised that the team of tutors 
consisted almost entirely of full-time lecturing staff who had already worked together 
on the course in previous years, and that there were no concerns about whether an 
individual tutor could be trusted to prepare adequately in advance.  On the other hand, 
fifteen minutes' reading time is insufficient for students with some reading disabilities, 
and a suitable alternative for them will have to be developed when the exercise is 
repeated.   
 
The handout reminded the students that it is the task of a court to weigh and balance 
the arguments, and it gave a brief analysis of Bennion's and Lord Bingham's 
treatments of the issues.  It noted that Bennion does not explicitly state why he prefers 
the arguments against treating the Real IRA as proscribed, other than to say that it is 
the paramount duty of the judge to promote justice. The students were asked to 
consider whether he was arguing that because the balance of legal principle favoured 
the accused (no punishment without clear law; certainty and predictability in the law; 
just outcome), the statute should not apply to the Real IRA.  
 
The students were given some further contextual material, drawn from the Dickson 
article, which notes that Parliament can easily choose to rectify an error: following an 
adverse decision in another Northern Irish case, R (Hume et al) v. Londonderry 
Justices 1972, Parliament passed a statute changing the law the next day.11 Hence the 
crucial issue for Bennion, they were asked to consider, is whether or not the law is 
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being followed, however obnoxious the result might be in the particular case. If 
judges vary how they interpret the law to suit particular outcomes in particular cases, 
the law is no longer predictable and it is no longer applies equally to all.  It is better 
that the guilty go free occasionally than that the rule of law be undermined.  Would 
the decision of the House of Lords be a classic example of the saying “hard cases 
make bad law”?  
 
Finally, the handout concluded by asking the students whether they thought this was a 
case of a minor drafting error which a court should rectify, or a case of unclear 
criminal law which it is for Parliament to correct.  Each class had a brief whole-class 
discussion to check whether the students had understood the handout and to elicit their 
views on the final question.   
 
In conclusion, it seems that the exercise at the very least stimulated some discussion 
and questions on a topic which typically in my lecturing experience has sent students 
to waking resentment or sleep. While this may say more about my lecturing abilities 
than the topic, I suspect other academics have had similar experience when giving 
traditional lectures on statutory interpretation. The exercise now needs to be 
developed to operate more fairly for students from all backgrounds, and formally 
evaluated to see where it can be improved. I am happy to share materials with any 
lecturer or tutor who would like to see what was used for the exercise and might wish 
to adapt it for their own teaching: please feel free to contact me at 
k.e.goodall@stir.ac.uk. I would also welcome comments from any reader who might 
like to suggest improvements or other approaches to promoting the study of statutory 
interpretation among a generation of students awash in statute.   
